

## INTERAGENCY TRANSFORMATION: IMPROVING DIALOGUE AMONG THE INTERAGENCY FOR CAMPAIGN DESIGN

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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INTERAGENCY FOR CAMPAIGN DESIGN**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Over the past few years there has been a debate over the failure of the American government to focus and coordinate all of the elements of power into a unified effort for the strategic security challenges of the 21st century. This debate has led many people to call for a transformation of the interagency process. Whether or not this process becomes codified in law, or continues according to the current concept of the lead agency framework, incorporating diverse U.S. agencies into the joint campaign design will be a significant step to improving applications of national power in a campaign as outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (December 2006). This SRP reviews current joint doctrine and finds the doctrine is sufficient to support the lead Federal Agency concept in campaign design when the effort is supported by a humanistic approach to integrate other governmental agencies into the mission. This SRP explores options for reducing the obstacles associated with the stovepipe, hierarchical bureaucracy of government. Research confirms that that relevant strategic leadership and thinking processes can assist the DOD planners in leveraging the

expertise of interagency partners to develop holistic ways to maximize the operational art of joint planning.

## INTERAGENCY TRANSFORMATION: IMPROVING DIALOGUE AMONG THE INTERAGENCY FOR CAMPAIGN DESIGN

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who would profit by the old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.

—Niccolo Machiavelli “The Prince” (1532)<sup>1</sup>

As Machiavelli commented on over 500 years ago, change is difficult, especially when it involves the large bureaucratic departments of government. Over the past several years, many observers of our government have noted that as a nation we are failing to use all the elements of the U. S. national power in concert to address the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These critics cite a need for transformation in the way our various federal agencies collaborate when formulating achievable ways (diplomatic, information, military, and economic {DIME}) to enhance our nation’s capacity to shape the global environment and thereby to protect and preserve our vital interests. The growing debate has led many to call for interagency reform—in order to make the interagency process effective—through legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of the 1986. However, today’s military planners must recognize that in order to meet today’s security challenges they must leverage current joint doctrine and integrate the interagency community as effectively as possible within the structure of the National Security Council while the debate continues. It is incumbent that joint planners take the lead when a grand strategy requires a secure path and extends beyond military solutions. Our oath as military officers obligates us to lead others in defense of our national interests. Joint planners have the ways and means to execute the integrated



planning process among other agencies as outlined in joint publications, while planners must engage others, using various means to assure a unity of effort in the process.

Since there currently is not a formal, legal doctrinal structure to bring all the elements of national power together, planners need to rely on a sound interagency design to achieve a cohesive, integrated solution to address the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous issues to affect our vital interests. The interagency needs to be incorporated into the design phase early enough to achieve an integrated approach. This initiative requires planners to exercise strategic leadership in order to overcome the tendency of some to truncate the process in support of their own views or to activate lukewarm supporters. Planners must establish a common framework for addressing issues into order to build consensus in support of viable actions. Planners who exhibit candid and collegiate attitudes when incorporating other government agencies (OGAs) in the operational design will succeed in developing a campaign that fully employs all the elements of national power.

When it comes to developing a solution for a security issue, DOD must appreciate the importance of interagency processes. Joint planning can reduce the complexity of a crisis situation by bringing in experts from across the government, along with contacts outside of government. This process supports policy aims in the near and long term; it facilitates the development of realistic options for policymakers. Joint planning leads to a consensus strategy that can be translated into action for the other agencies outside the military command and control (C2). This guidance then leads to a Political-Military (Pol-Mil) plan that gives direction to agencies in the form of purpose and strategy, mission elements, and objectives. It helps to integrate organizational constructs,

mechanisms, and practices for managing implementation of the design. An effective interagency process has secondary effects: it fixes accountability for the ultimate decision and reinforces the political-military relationship in a positive manner. It mobilizes several coalitions with capabilities and resources that reduce the military burden, while potentially enhancing required military actions.<sup>2</sup> DOD has often been charged to serve as the lead agency due to its capability to plan and because it is resourced to execute options in a timely manner, even though the military component may not have been the best option for accomplishing the strategic objective.

In order to achieve a unity of effort in the interagency environment, we must first acknowledge that dialogue between the civil and political planner, on one hand, and DoD planners, on the other hand, has been tense and mostly unproductive. This is not a recent phenomenon; it is an ongoing historical point of strife that has hampered the constructive exchange of ideas required at the strategic level of warfare. During World War I, this tension was evident in the breakdown between the British army, the people, and the government as they all struggled to address issues of 'modern mass warfare'.<sup>3</sup> Even today, the U. S. trinity<sup>4</sup> suffers from this breakdown as it struggles in strategic discourse dealing with the 'war on terror'. Dr. Ulrich affirms Colin Gray's argument that political and military leaders "tend to lack understanding of, and empathy for each others roles."<sup>5</sup> Gray attributes this lack of empathy to four points of friction that impair dialogue; (1) the clash of cultures, (2) reciprocal ignorance, (3) distinctive responsibilities, and (4) the difficulties of strategy.<sup>6</sup> These challenges are not unique to the POL/Mil relationship: Any time two cultures meet for any reason, there is potential for a clash that can impair genuine communication. But the POL/Mil clash is unique

because it is fraught with reciprocal ignorance due to the failure of both parties to understand the Clausewitz' explication of the "grammar and logic" of war. While both parties understand the Clausewitzan theory that "war is a continuum of policy" and recognize their roles, they fail to engage in the strategic discourse required for the implementation of an imperative war policy. Gray maintains that,

In modern times, there are few politicians who understand...the 'grammar' of war, how war works as war or even the how war works at the preparatory stage...and there are few generals...who understand the 'logic' of war." Distinctive responsibilities complicate the process of orchestrating the 'grammar' and 'logic' of war through constructive dialogue. The politicians' (and their strategists) role in national strategy is to choose among competing demands and opportunities...at times they have to strike a balance between commitment to the military and to the civil purpose ... as well as the needs of war in the near term verses the preservation of national assets for a productive peace in the future In comparison to the expectation of a nation of a military professional, whose responsibility is for the "military integrity and strategic effectiveness of the armed forces"...."loyalty upward and downward"...."a repository of sound military advice" ...and ..." call political fantasy" what it is, when that fantasy deals with military action. A nation that holds to the truth that war is an instrument of politics places a great interest in the determining *Casus belli*<sup>7</sup> and has to consider the difficulty of shaping a strategy to meet the objectives the various parties involved, i.e. 'strategy is difficult'.<sup>8</sup>

Planners who accept and address these potential obstacles can convert them into an opportunity to increase their relationship with their interagency peers at the combatant command. George C. Marshall—who epitomized the Pol/Mil norms—encouraged his staff to seek the liabilities of perceived strategic incompetence of their non-military counterparts.<sup>9</sup> He advised them on to use the occasion to educate the civil servant as a strategic thinker and to demonstrate the military's unquestioning acceptance of civilian authority.<sup>10</sup> This enhanced and enlightened relationship will soften cultural competition and foster a concrete effort in developing viable prospects for fully integrating of the DIME into the interagency in campaign design.

Joint doctrine does not define planning. So we must look to the United States Marine Corps for a definition of planning; “Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur.”<sup>11</sup> This definition enhances our appreciation of Napoleon when he proclaims the essence of great commandership in war is the ability to formulate innovative military solutions and effectively put them into action through campaigning. Likewise, America’s great captains of military art (George Washington, U.S. Grant, Dwight Eisenhower) were masters of envisioning the broad purposes on which they designed campaigns to accomplish their nation’s strategic objective.<sup>12</sup> Given these historical examples, current leaders should actively develop interagency plans on which to execute campaigns and to support national security objectives: “Campaign design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated activities essential for solving complex theater problems.”<sup>13</sup> Yet our doctrine does not incorporate other agencies into the process until the planning phase, thereby negating the opportunity for commanders to receive input that could lead them to conceive solutions, influence events, or achieve desired effects without the use of military means. Design is the framework of operational art (the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs).<sup>14</sup> Design facilitates a systems perspective of the operational environment.<sup>15</sup> To frame a campaign plan involving coordinated interagency support, commanders must envision operations within the context of all of the instruments of national power, with a focus on unity of effort. Our doctrine recognizes that mission planning conducted by the geographic combatant commander should be coordinated with the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Energy (DOE), through

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>16</sup> Such broad-based planning facilitates definition and clarification of strategic aims, end states, and the means to achieve them. Commanders and planners should consider specific conditions that could lead to mission failure, as well as those that mark success. Commanders must ensure that unity of effort with other agencies contributes to the U.S.

Government's (USG's) overall strategic aims and objectives.<sup>17</sup> Current doctrine calls for the CCDR to develop an annex V for coordination, but this comes very late in the planning process for meaningful input:

For interagency transition and exit criteria Annex V lays out to the greatest degree possible what the combatant commander desires as the entry and exit conditions for the USG civilian agencies during the operation. It notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phase of the operation or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options. Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation assists in the scheduling and coordination.<sup>18</sup>

While the current process is functional, it does not maximize the input of OGA innovation and creativity prior to framing the issue.

If campaign design is the recognized cornerstone for the development of a campaign, why would we want to limit inputs from OGAs during the review of strategic guidance? Incorporating the interagency into the preliminary sketch enables commanders to envision creative possibilities other than military action for flexible “courses of action (COA) early integration eases the burden of socializing the plan within the government.”<sup>19</sup> It ensures that the desired end-state and exit criteria are understood by all parties; it fixes accountability of OGAs prior to development of COAs; and it synchronizes communication strategies for a coherent USG message to targeted audiences. The second-and-third order benefits of including the OGAs early provides for: building habitual working relationships, for early collaboration and interoperability,

and for creative solutions to challenges that could result in the requirement for little or no application of military power.

Until there is congressional action to integrate the executive elements of DIME beyond the realm of passive coordination, DOD should serve as the lead agency for achieving change and promoting a greater unity of effort. With its significant budget, DOD is currently the only executive agency whose organization and culture contains the attributes to synchronize and synergize the application of power in a collaborative manner. The DOD currently struggles to establish a joint environment, yet it has built a solid foundation for the network-based and collaborative atmosphere required to enable clear hierarchical support and a supportive relationship to enhance unity of effort.<sup>20</sup> The DOD culture of teamwork and embracing the kind of leadership that values followership should now welcome adaptive and flexible thinkers to contribute to the development of ideas by OGAs to be explored and perhaps applied to resolving current security issues. The current DOD education system is already developing strategic thinkers across the interagency spectrum and leveraging their input at the combatant command level for unified action. The joint phasing<sup>21</sup> model will facilitate the involvement of other agencies as DOD seeks to ease the burden of future encounters in support of global policy. Until there is a formal unity of effort, DOD can continue to rely on coordination and direct liaison, or it can work towards a comprehensive design utilizing the elements of DIME.

#### Strategic Leadership Efforts to Enhance Dialogue

A challenge facing the interagency planning team is defining what the group must accomplish in a session in which there is no formal hierarchical decisionmaking structure. In an intellectual environment in which competence and credentials define

one's status—by in which at the same time individuals can be intimidated by the accouterments of the military—reaching the simplest decision can be a monumental task. Prudent planners must realize that the ideologies of political appointees will shape views of the various agencies involved in the design of solutions. President George W. Bush's adviser, Dov Zakheim, observed in the novel *FISCO*, "A country that has its own major agencies at war (with one another) is not going to fight a war well." In the current Bush Administration, the split started at the top and extended down to the working level, to where "people who had to work with, and trust, each other—and they didn't."<sup>22</sup> In the fall of 2007, Michael C. Desch commented in his article "*Salute and Disobey?*" that effective policy, good decisions, and positive outcomes between civilian and military leaders requires relationships of respect, candor, collaboration, cooperation—and subordination.<sup>23</sup> While this is a not a new or an astounding insight for any mature adult or open-minded joint planner, it is nevertheless a sad and true commentary of an obstacle that blocks the way to an effective design of integrated solutions among representatives of the various departments of the executive branch of our government responsible for campaign development. Whether or not the interagency transformation happens through an act of Congress or within the current NSC structure, professionals—people with great expertise in their particular fields—of the various departments must embrace Desch's sound advice on the humanistic requirements in campaign design.<sup>24</sup> Agreements among professionals on many occasions have been secured by a simple handshake and have led to some of the more memorable applications of an interagency solution.

As members of the Department of Defense (DOD) increase their collaborative planning with others outside of the department, a number of factors will complicate the coordination process, including the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, procedures, and decisionmaking processes.<sup>25</sup> Joint Publication 3-08, Vol I, "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I" acknowledges that, even within the defined bureaucratic system, interagency actions may be based on both personality and process consistent with other large institutions; they rely on such processes as persuasion, negotiation, and consensus-building.<sup>26</sup> This was recognized by law-makers in the 1940s when they voiced their expectations at the passage of National Security Act of 1947:

Supporters of the 1947 act intended and expected that the structures they created for interagency coordination would lead to "integrated policies and procedures." While some issues have been well coordinated over the decades, many have fallen victim to interagency disputes, bureaucratic politics, inadequate attention, insufficient resources, and the random errors of human behavior. The departments and agencies involved in U.S. national security have differing perspectives, cultures, authorities, resources, capabilities, and personnel systems. It takes time and extraordinary effort to develop agreed approaches to problems and then to oversee the implementation of policy decisions. Often, the result is a compromise that may be ambivalent in wording or otherwise inadequate to obtain unity of effort.<sup>27</sup>

Accordingly, planners must recognize that the military concept of decisionmaking is rooted in a linear process which more than likely has served leaders well throughout their careers as they have solved problems at the tactical and operational levels. However, to make good strategic decisions, leaders must carefully consider the second- and third-order effects of their decisions before they commit national means in pursuit of uncertain ends. The need to make advantageous decisions in a complex environment in



which outcomes may be uncertain requires strategic leaders to consider other approaches for making decisions. Strategic leaders cannot simply rely on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to identify the doctrine solution, rather than the best solution.

The March 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* directs DOD to be an active participant and a key organization in transforming America's national security institutions, which are changing radically to confront the challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>28</sup> Decisionmakers at this level must arrive at solutions in the current ambiguous joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental environment for problems that at times will be volatile and filled with uncertainties and complexities. As they operate alongside others in an interagency team, DOD strategic leaders must appreciate multiple decisionmaking models. The traditional linear approach of the MDMP for solving problems might produce the best course for a military action, but not the best decision for achieving the political objective. In 2004, the Army made the strategic decision to commit to joint interdependence, a risky decision due to the uncertainty of the unknown. No one knew how effective the concept would be or how long it would take to institutionalize it.<sup>29</sup> This decision required the Acting Army Secretary and Army Chief of Staff to think beyond the routine confines of an institution that relies on the self-sufficiency of the combined arms team; they had to acknowledge that further decisions for the Army would require bargaining with others in DOD to ensure the Army sustains its capabilities for land warfare as directed by Title X. This decision has now reshaped the approaches the Army may take, since it has increased the requirement for consensus among other organizations before making a

decision. Army decisionmakers are obligated to educate as well as persuade others in DOD to continue their support of national security objectives as a result of the 2004 Army leaders' decision to participate in national security operations. Army leaders whose decisionmaking process had for decades relied on a linear/rational design were indeed challenged by this new less clear-cut paradigm.

From the day individuals enter the military, their service begins developing them according to a leadership model that stresses effective decisionmaking. Each service has its own model and terminology, based on its culture. But all of these models adhere to a general theme of leadership development based on established core competencies (what a leader does) and attributes (what a leader is). The Army model nurtures desirable attributes – of character, of presence, and of intellectual capacity. These attributes enhance core individual competencies, thereby enabling Soldiers to lead, to develop further, and to achieve.<sup>30</sup> Leaders exhibit varying degrees of balance between competencies and attributes, but those who are acknowledged and valued as sound decisionmakers typically demonstrate intellectual strength; they stand out among their peers because of their mental resources of sound judgment, mental agility, and intuition. This intellectual attribute is formalized through the MDMP, which specifies a clearly defined goal. However, strategic leaders must recognize that while this attribute has served them well at the tactical and operational levels, in order to succeed at the strategic level they need to expand their intellectual capacity and consider a multiple-perspective approach in their decisionmaking, especially as the DOD evolves as a critical link in the interagency transformation.

The principles of decisionmaking require at least four basic elements: framing or defining the issue, gathering data, reaching a conclusion, and then making a decision. The military has been served well by the framework of the rational approach of the MDMP, which indeed incorporate the four elements of decisionmaking. However, as decisions increase in their complexity at the strategic level, DOD strategic decisionmakers must open up their intellectual receptivity to include an appreciation of other theories. This especially applies when the decision will require the support of co-equal leaders within the interagency who must be persuaded to contribute to the implementation of the decision. Many of these leaders will come from diverse backgrounds of strategic thinking and decisionmaking.

There are just as many theories on decisionmaking as there are on war. Of course, some carry more weight than others. Indeed, Donald Kettl and James Fesler have determined that no single approach predominates. However, they then focus on four decision-making approaches for public administration.<sup>31</sup> All four approaches depend on decisionmakers' ability to deal with the fundamental problems of information – how it is acquired, weighted, and acted on – and of values. Issues of information and value will constantly intermingle as strategic leaders seek to make decisions among the interagency.<sup>32</sup> Kettl and Fesler then describe four approaches: (1) the rational approach, a classical approach which builds on the works of microeconomics and holds efficiency as the highest value; (2) the bargaining approach, which seeks to maximize political support and involves conflict, negotiation, persuasion, and individual stakes; (3) the participative decision-making approach, which seeks to improve decisions by intimately involving those affected by the decision; (4) the public-choice approach,

which attempts to substitute market-like forces for other incentives.<sup>33</sup> Senior DOD leaders who understand these four approaches and have the confidence to apply them in various situations can leverage information as it is presented and balance that intelligence with a broad understanding of the values of the others involved as they finalize their decisions. Competent military leaders can confidently select the appropriate approach for arriving at given decisions.

### Decision traps

In each of the four approaches to decision-making, planners must guard against decision traps that can derail the process or lead to poor or incomplete decisions. In *Decision Traps*, Russo and Schemaker itemize what they consider the ten most dangerous traps of decisionmaking: Plunging In, Frame Blindness, Lack of Frame Control, Overconfidence in Your Judgment, Shortsighted Shortcuts, Shooting from the Hips, Group Failure, Fooling Yourself about Feedback, not keeping Track, and Failure to Audit Your Decision Process.<sup>34</sup> Planners must remain aware of these potential errors in order to stay focused on the problem and to provide sound recommendations.

The first three traps normally occur with framing the issue, which can be a monstrous task during development of concepts for an operational design. Many planners have the tendency to “plunge in” and reach a conclusion on sparse information before thinking about the crux of the issue.<sup>35</sup> Framing blindness could lead to a design that overlooks the best option or leads to loss of important objectives.<sup>36</sup> The final trap in framing is losing control due to an inability to concisely define the problem in more than one way or to allowing the vision of others to unduly influence the scope of the

conundrum. The issue of framing should be addressed by using a model that facilitates a holistic view and that can be shared by all the parties involved.

When gathering intelligence, two traps are overconfidence in one's judgment and taking shortsighted shortcuts. A group that is overconfident in their assumptions and opinions can fail to recognize key factual information that could re-shape the design. They must also guard against an implied trust in the most available information or convenient facts. A thorough interagency planning team must view information and analysis in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. When gathering and using information from OGAs, they need to qualify their estimates in terms of a level of confidence they have in the data. Such statements of confidence will enable others on the team to interpret the worthiness of the estimate and apply a more critical lens to it.

A team using this approach will increase their understanding and appreciation of the problem and discern its possible relationship, to the centers of gravity across the different phases of a campaign.<sup>37</sup> It is beneficial to guard against these traps when gathering information, because this awareness assists in defining an adversary's principal strengths and weaknesses.

When considering information for a decision, the two traps to avoid are shooting from the hip and group failure. Many will collect superior intelligence, but "wing it" when actually finalizing their decisions.<sup>38</sup> They will base a decision on intuition verses using a systematic procedure. While making decisions based on one's intuition is useful and has served many well, it can be limiting. Winging it is useful for simple at best matters—where little is at stake for our nation. But complex decisions should at least be

considered on a subjective model, if not an objective model.<sup>39</sup> The interagency process brings together many smart people; at times this group of smart people will assume that any decision that emerges from the group has to be an excellent one.<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, what normally occurs is a decision based on group-think and findings based on consensus. The lead planner must encourage divergent and convergent thinking to leverage the collective intellect of the group and use it as a measure to protect against a group failure.<sup>41</sup> Planners should assess what is filtered and determine how much is filtered from the group for the commander. There is a delicate balance between being efficient and screening out too much data that may hamper the commander's view as they favor their branch in the application of operational art.

The U.S. military has done very well over the last few years in recording its lessons learned. But time and time again we as a organization and as a nation have failed to learn from these recorded experiences. We have a tendency to fool ourselves about the feedback, either due to ego or a distorted hindsight.<sup>42</sup> Further, even though we record our lessons, we fail to keep track of them. Many times we do not have a systematic method to track our lessons. Or when we do, we fail to review them in a meaningful way that highlights the key lesson.<sup>43</sup>

The final trap in decision-making is failure to audit the process. DOD planners—whether in the lead or in a supporting role—must recognize the decision approach being used by the Joint Interagency Coordination Group and ensure that the assembly does not become victim to any of the previous nine traps.<sup>44</sup> Audits will enable the development of a comprehensive vision and development of a concept that will achieve the desired objective.

The United States Army War College (USAWC) has identified six senior leader metacompetencies – identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. The USAWC cites mental agility and interpersonal maturity as the key components of strategic decision-making, regardless of the approach decisionmakers select in a given situation. Mental agility serves decisionmakers well in all four approaches to decision-making because it enables them to gather and filter information effectively in order to attend to what is relevant. From a systems perspective, mentally agile leaders challenge assumptions, facilitate constructive dissent, and analyze second- and third-order consequences of their decisions.<sup>45</sup> While making decisions using an approach that relies on bargaining, they are comfortable when all the information is not available because they comfortably rely on their intuition to make a timely decision.<sup>46</sup> The metacompetency of interpersonal maturity is a desirable trait for strategic leaders who recognize that consensus-building and negotiations are key skills in the bargain-and-participative approach, especially since peers, outside agencies, and other governments do not necessarily respond to direct orders.<sup>47</sup> Interpersonal maturity also serves decisionmakers well in the participative and public approaches, since this trait makes them good listeners who willingly ask subordinates to join in the process; they are comfortable with empowering subordinates to assist in solving problems. Professionally astute decisionmakers have the foresight to realize that the MDMP –an effective and rational process –might be the best in some circumstances, but not necessarily the most appropriate approach for reaching a decision in the interagency realm. So they will select the method which is best in a given context for reaching a solution that benefits the nation. Confident leaders

have self-awareness and exhibit the willingness to use multiple perspectives as they make decisions. When it comes to making tough calls, they are greatly appreciated.<sup>48</sup>

Strategic decisionmakers must have a keen awareness of culture when determining what approach to use with others during negotiations. Many people around the government see the military as action-oriented. They believe the military is prone to making decisions quickly, compared to the political appointees who love to talk about making decisions, which may or may not be consummated in the future.<sup>49</sup> Leaders who are willing to slow down and to take the time to build a consensus with solid preparations along the way will do well. Many organizational cultures feel negotiations are just brainstorming sessions and agendas; they believe short-term decisions are of little consequence.<sup>50</sup> A solid approach when dealing with any group is to discover what it is that they value and then to find a common basis in values among the parties that will sustain the decisions they arrive at. DOD leaders must anticipate how other parties will review the information that is available and understand that in many cultures it will be seen through a different lens. A rational approach may work well with DOD partners, but with a more diverse group the participative approach will allow for others to join in the process.

Understanding other agencies' cultures is just as important as understanding the cultures of other nations. As the DOD requirement to make decisions in concert with other agencies increases, DOD leaders must develop an awareness of other agencies' institutional characteristics and determine how best to deal with them, in much the same way one has to consider another nation's culture when arriving at hard decisions.



Joint planners must recognize that their counterparts not only were developed in a different culture, but also rose to the common level of authority, shared by both, in a climate different from the military's. While there are many similarities between loyal servants of the other agencies and the military, one must recognize there are several key differences. Military officers spend twice as much time in the classroom and developing plans; military members take an oath that values mission accomplishment above life itself; they are developed in an organization that cherishes personal character; and they are instilled with a warrior ethos.<sup>51</sup> Planners of other agencies could be inexperienced, bright, and intelligent; their favorite job before working in government was driving an ice cream truck.<sup>52</sup> This does not suggest that they are any less capable, but DoD planners must recognize these potential cultural differences and their impact on the process.

When future challenges of our nation require implementation of a directive similar to *Presidential Decision Directive – 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations)*, DOD strategic leaders must be prepared to participate as members of an interagency group in which the rational decision-making approach might not be favored. Leaders with a multiple perspective of various styles of decision-making will be more capable of making a contribution to the group and assisting at arriving at the best solution for our nation.

#### Strategic Thinking Framework for Dialogue

Well rounded strategic leaders realize the importance of being open to ideas outside their preview, but they may have difficulty generating new ideas and options in the diverse culture of a multi-agency group. Whether planners engage other agencies

during the development of a theater strategy or during the design of a campaign, these leaders must establish a framework for thinking that welcomes the flow of creative ideas that can be viewed with a critical lens in support of the envisioned end state. When forming a strategic plan, the more creative CCDR planners are in the application of the operational art of other agencies into the design of a campaign, the more likely the military objective will support the national objective. Even when planners display ideal leadership skills such as those previously discussed, they must guard against group think when framing the problem. The USAWC strategic thinking framework is only one of many models that can be useful in the difficult task of formulating thoughts; thoughts that will lead to a holistic approach to operational design. The USAWC Strategic Thinking framework offers a sound foundation which enables planners to know themselves, to know others, and to know how to reflect on issues.<sup>53</sup>

The USAWC framework is ideal for generating the assumptions and facts on which an integrated planning team, skilled in operational art, can base a campaign design. It provides a point of reference for all parties and involves all of them comfortably in the development of strategic art. Since the framework integrates five different thinking lenses (Creative, Critical, Systems, Thinking in Time, and Ethics), it enables planners to develop concepts and view them as products of reflective judgment.<sup>54</sup> With its five lenses, the framework helps avoid blind spots, enhances reflective judgment, and stimulates discourse among the various agencies' representatives as they work towards an integrated solution.<sup>55</sup> In addition, the framework allows for the exploration of concepts and ideas that are viewed through more than one lens at a time.

The system-thinking point of the model is very functional; it enables interagency representatives to view aspects of the operational environment while stimulating thought, dialogue, and assessment of the key elements of the adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) systems.<sup>56</sup> OGAs' involvement provides a different and possibly a better-defined linkage among the nodes of the military's produced System of Systems Assessment. The reason we should not just view PMESII with one mode of thinking is that this narrow vision could blind the group due to the highly rigid, architectural like structure of the SoSA.<sup>57</sup> A systems approach does allow for focus on the whole issue, but it fails to clarify specific concerns as the critical thinking model does. This systems approach can lead to heuristic solutions because it does not provide for challenge of assumptions, inferences, and points of views.<sup>58</sup> The SoSA approach does not encourage creative thinking "the ability to produce novel ideas that are valued by others".<sup>59</sup> Indeed creative thinking increases the flow of ideas and dialogue among the interagency planners. By using elements of each of the five lenses with others from the interagency the design can be shaped by ideas that evolve from a divergence of thoughts that are then filtered by a convergence of thought of the representatives of our national power.<sup>60</sup>

## Conclusion

The debate on the integration of the interagency and on how best to accomplish a more comprehensive application of the elements of national power will continue as an unsolved issue in the near future. But DOD planners can make a difference today through the use of personal relationships, demonstrated leadership, and strategic thinking to improve interagency dialogue. Planners who recognize the influence OGAs

carry around the world and who make the effort to of engage them have the potential to enhance operational designs. DOD planners should exhibit leadership (leadership is sometimes being a good follower) and openness to ideas in order to leverage the power of the interagency by linking military objectives to vital national goals. Planners who heed the words of Sun Tzu, “*Strategy without Tactics is the Longest Road to Victory, Tactics without Strategy is the Noise before Defeat*”<sup>61</sup> will be successful. Those who fail to embrace the interagency process and to incorporate OGAs into the design will only develop more tactics and will lead our nation to over-reliance on military solutions.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and The Discourses* (New York,: The Modern Library, 1950), 21.

<sup>2</sup> Len Hawley, “Achieving Success in U.S. Policy with International Intervention”, briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 17 DEC 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: University Press, 1999), 61.

<sup>4</sup> Trinity as defined by Clausewitz’s theory of Consequences; the people, the army and the government. See Michael Howard and Peter Parat, eds., *Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College National Security Policy and Strategy Course, AY08), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Gray, 56-63.

<sup>7</sup> This term “Casus belli” is a Latin language expression meaning the justification for acts of war. See Phillip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. and The Merrian-Webster Editorial Staff, eds., *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged*, (Springfield, MA: Merrian-Webster, Inc, 1986), 349.

<sup>8</sup> Gray, 56-63.

<sup>9</sup> Don M. Snider, Pjt. Dir., and Lloyd J, Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Professional*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, 2005), 659.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 661.

<sup>11</sup> Paul K. Van Riper, *Planning For and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, March 2006), 2.

<sup>12</sup> Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook, AY08, Final Draft*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), vii.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> JP 3-0, GL-24.

<sup>15</sup> Campaign Planning, 13.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 December 2006), II-6.

<sup>17</sup> JP 3-0, x.

<sup>18</sup> Chairman of The Joint Staff, Joint Publication, 3-08 Vol I "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I", (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 17 March 2006), available from <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/paragraphsPop.jsp?cld=1734&parId>; accessed 4 January 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook, AY08, Final Draft*, 31.

<sup>20</sup> Paul C. Jussel, Chr., Implementing National Military Strategy, Selected Readings, Volume II, Academic Year 2008, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 3 December 2007-1 February 2008), 36-43.

<sup>21</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0*, 32-33. Definition IAW with Joint doctrine: Phase - A definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. This is useful in the context of JP 5.0 where "Arranging operations is an element of operational design, and phasing is a key aspect of this element. Phasing is a useful tool for any type of operation, from those that require large-scale combat to operations such as disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, and peacekeeping.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 103.

<sup>23</sup> Richard B. Myers et al, "Salute and Disobey," *Foreign Affairs*, v86 no 5, (September/October 2007[journal on-line]; available from [http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.library.carlisle.army.mil/hww/results/results\\_fulltext\\_maincontent.frame.jhtml;hwwilsonid=JR5OSCR25RBJJQA3DIMSFGOADUNGIIIV0](http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.library.carlisle.army.mil/hww/results/results_fulltext_maincontent.frame.jhtml;hwwilsonid=JR5OSCR25RBJJQA3DIMSFGOADUNGIIIV0); Internet; accessed 22 December 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> *Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0*, II-6.

<sup>26</sup> Chairman of The Joint Staff, Joint Publication, 3-08 Vol I, available from <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/paragraphsPop.jsp?cld=1734&parId>: accessed 4 January 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Charles A Stevenson, "Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947". Joint Force Quarterly (1 January 2008), 129-133.  
<http://www.proquest.com.library.carlisle.army.mil/> (accessed December 20, 2007).

<sup>28</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2004), 43.

<sup>29</sup> Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Crawfordsville: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 607.

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership –Competent, Confident, and Agile*, Field Manual 6-22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 12 October 2006), A-1.

<sup>31</sup> *Selected Readings, Strategic Leadership Course* (Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 26 Sept. 2007) 339, (Donald F. Kettl and James W. Fesler, *Politics of the Administrative Process* (n.p.: CQ Press, 2005) 227).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 340-342.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 342.

<sup>34</sup> J. Edward Russo and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, *Decision Traps, The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-Making and How To Overcome Them*, (New York: Fireside, 1990) xvii.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> JP 5.0, page IV-11

<sup>38</sup> Russo, 119.

<sup>39</sup> Russo, 142

<sup>40</sup> Russo, 145.

<sup>41</sup> Russo, 145.

<sup>42</sup> Russo, 179.

<sup>43</sup> Russo, 201.

<sup>44</sup> Russo, 212.

<sup>45</sup> Colonel Stephen A. Shambach, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2004), 58.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 60.

<sup>48</sup> Paul C. Nutt, *Making Tough Decisions, Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision Making* (San Francisco: Jossay-Bass, 1989), 132.

<sup>49</sup> Richard D. Lewis, *When Culture Collide/Leading Across Cultures, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*, (Boston: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006), 170.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 171.

<sup>51</sup> Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., *Inside View – A Leader’s Observations on Leadership*, (Greensboro, North Carolina: Center for Creative Leadership, 1997), 27.

<sup>52</sup> Ricks, 202.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Selective Readings, AY 2008, Strategic Thinking, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 13-24 August 2007), 37.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>56</sup> Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook, Final Working Draft*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. War Army War College, AY 08), 17.

<sup>57</sup> Dr. Milan Vego, “Systems Approach to Center of Gravity,” Campaigning (Fall 2006), 20.

<sup>58</sup> USAWC Selective Readings, 53.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 73.

<sup>61</sup> Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 41.